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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provision and statute is 
determinative of the issues in this case: 
United States Constitution 
AMENDMENT IV [Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992) 
77-23-5. Time for service - Officer may 
request assistance. 
(1) The magistrate must insert a 
direction in the warrant that it be served in 
the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral 
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe 
a search is necessary in the night to seize 
the property prior to it being concealed, 
destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other 
good reason; in which case he may insert a 
direction that it be served any time of the 
day or night. An officer may request other 
persons to assist him in conducting the 
search. 
(2) The search warrant shall be served 
within ten days from the date of issuance. 
Any search warrant not executed within such 
time shall be void and shall be returned to 
the court or magistrate as not executed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION OP 
"NIGHTTIME" IS NOT ULTIMATELY REVIEWED UNDER 
THE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS STANDARD BECAUSE IT IS 
EITHER BASED ON A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE 
LAW OR AN INTERPRETATION OF LAW WHICH IS 
REVIEWED FOR CORRECTNESS. 
In response to the State's argument that the "trial 
court's factual determination of "nighttime" was totally 
dependent on the definition it selects" (Appellant's Br. at 10), 
defendants inappropriately focus this Court's attention on the 
trial court's factfinding rather than on the conclusion of law 
imbedded in the court's decision (Appellees' Brief at 4-6). 
In State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), the 
supreme court stated: 
The appellate court... does not 
consider and weigh the evidence de novo. The 
mere fact that on the same evidence the 
appellate court might have reached a 
different result does not justify it in 
setting the findings aside. It may regard a 
finding as clearly erroneous only if the 
finding is without adequate evidentiary 
support or induced bv an erroneous view of 
the law, 
Id. at 193 (emphasis added) (citing 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur 
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971)), which 
further states, "Insofar as a finding is derived from the 
application of an improper legal standard to the facts, it cannot 
stand"). 
In Kniaht v. Hescock. 404 A.2d 107 (Vt. 1979) (per 
2 
curiam), the dissent summarized the law with regard to findings 
based on an interpretation of the law: 
But the clearly erroneous standard should not 
be used to insulate a finding prompted by the 
application of an erroneous legal standard. 
Shull v. Daim. Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 
152, 155 (8th Cir. 1977) (citing 9 C. Wright 
& A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 
2585-86 (1971)). Such a situation presents a 
question of law correctable by this Court for 
mere error. See United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co.. 333 U.S. 364, 394, 68 S. 
Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948. 
Id. at 110 (Hill, J., dissenting). 
In this case also, as the State noted in its opening 
brief, the legality of the trial court's ruling was dependent on 
the definition it selected for "nighttime, and the State's entire 
argument is directed toward the proper legal standard for 
determining "nighttime" (Appellant's Br. at 10). Such a 
determination is essentially a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness, which the State also noted in its discussion of 
the standard of review on this issue (Appellant's Br. at 2). 
Therefore, in reviewing the trial court's findings, this Court 
should first analyze the correctness of the definition of 
"nighttime" chosen by the trial court. Thereafter, depending on 
this Court's decision as to the correct definition implicit in 
the statute, the trial court's findings may be reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard.1 
1
 If the Court holds that nighttime is that period between 
sunset and sunrise, then the State would, of course, concede that 
the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous, though a 
remand would still be necessary to determine if defendants' 
fundamental rights were prejudiced. Conversely, however, if the 
3 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS BOTH (1) MISSTATE THE STATE'S 
POSITION ON THE RELATION OF A VIOLATION OF A 
PROCEDURAL STATUTE TO A FUNDAMENTAL VIOLATION 
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND (2) THE HOLDING 
OF ROWE £1. 
Defendants assert that the State has taken the 
position, based on State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) (Rowe 
II), that the violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990), a 
procedural statute providing for nighttime entry, can never 
amount to a fundamental violation of Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution (Appellees' Brief at 8). This 
assertion is a gross misstatement of the State's position. 
The State's entire argument with respect to Rowe II 
(Appellant's Brief at Point II), is that defendants have failed 
to show that they have been prejudiced under the particular facts 
of this case. However, the State emphatically does not assert 
that in an appropriate case failure to obtain proper nighttime 
authorization, in conjunction with prejudicial circumstances, 
might not amount to a fundamental violation of Fourth Amendment. 
Defendants also incorrectly limit the holding of Rowe 
II in an attempt to show that it cannot apply to this case. 
Court adopts the federal standard, wherein "nighttime" is that 
period between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., then the trial court's 
determination would be clearly erroneous, and no further analysis 
is necessary. Finally, if the Court adopts the common law 
standard of "nighttime", which is a factual question about 
whether the defendants' features could be discerned under 
existing light, then this matter must be remanded to the trial 
court for that determination, which was never made, with the 
additional instruction that defendants show that their 
fundamental rights were prejudiced. 
4 
Specifically, defendant effectively argues that Rowe II held that 
only the existence of a valid arrest warrant, and no other 
circumstance, prevented a finding of no fundamental violation 
(Appellees' Br. at 8). Therefore, they argue, since there was no 
arrest warrant in this case, the nighttime entry was necessarily 
a fundamental violation. 
It is apparent from the cases relied upon in Rowe II, 
as argued in the State's opening brief, that a fundamental 
violation may be avoided in a variety of fact situations other 
than those in which the police also have an arrest warrant. See 
United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1978) 
(defendant's mother knew that house was to be searched and trial 
judge knew search would occur since he issued the warrant in the 
middle of the night). Since defendants have not shown the 
existence of other circumstances that would raise the procedural 
violation in this case to a fundamental violation, or that they 
were prejudiced as a result of the execution of the warrant, the 
trial court's granting of their motion to suppress was incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court adopt the effective federal definition of 
"nighttime," i.e., from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., and thereby 
reverse the trial court's order granting suppression. If this 
Court declines to adopt the federal definition, but instead holds 
that "nighttime" is strictly defined by that period from sunset 
to sunrise, then the State requests that this case be remanded 
5 
for an evidentiary hearing on the issues of prejudice and bad 
faith, consistent with Rowe II. If this Court should hold that 
"nighttime" is that period in which the face of a person is not 
discernible by the light of the sun or twilight, then the State 
requests this case be remanded for the additional factual 
determination of whether the warrant was served in darkness, 
again consistent with Rowe II. ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of September, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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